











Title of Thesis: SURVEILLANCE IN CYBERSPACE: 
APPLYING NATURAL AND PLACE 
MANAGER SURVEILLANCE TO SYSTEM 
TRESPASSING  
  
 Lizabeth Paige Remrey, Master of Arts, 2016 
  
Thesis Directed By: Associate Professor David Maimon  
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
 
 
Research on the criminological side of system trespassing (i.e. unlawfully gaining 
access to a computer system) is relatively rare and has yet to examine the effect of the 
presence of other users on the system during the trespassing event (i.e. the time of 
communication between a trespasser’s system and the infiltrated system).  This thesis 
seeks to analyze this relationship drawing on principles of Situational Crime 
Prevention, Routine Activities Theory, and restrictive deterrence.  Data were 
collected from a randomized control trial of target computers deployed on the Internet 
network of a large U.S. university.  This study examined whether the number (one or 
multiple) and type (administrative or non-administrative) of computer users present 
on a system reduced the seriousness and frequency of trespassing.  Results indicated 
that the type of user (administrative) produced a restrictive deterrent effect and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the last two decades, technology has expanded rapidly and with it has 
come new opportunities for cybercrime (Kim, Jeong, Kim, & So, 2011; Wall, 2008).   
In particular, system trespassing (i.e. unlawfully gaining access to a computer system) 
has become a major problem in the U.S. and worldwide.  Large, highly publicized 
cyber attacks, such as the Ashley Madison hack (Moon, 2015) or the £650 million 
cyber bank raid (Evans, 2015), have brought system trespassing and its consequences 
to the forefront of public attention.  Despite this, there is still little known about the 
true extent of system trespassing.  In fact, the FBI only recently released its first 
statistics regarding system trespassing, which report the number of arrests for 
“criminal computer intrusion”; but because these statistics solely report the number of 
arrests for system trespassing (105 arrests in 2014), these estimates still fail to 
elucidate the true extent of the problem (Friedman, 2015).   
In addition to difficulties in estimating its prevalence, system trespassing is a 
relatively untouched area of criminological research.  The few criminological studies 
that do address system trespassing generally look at system trespassing victimization 
through the lens of Routine Activities Theory (Maimon, Kamerdze, Cukier, & 
Sobesto, 2013; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010).  On the other hand, other studies 
examine system trespassing from the trespasser’s point of view (i.e. examining the 
behavior of the trespasser) (Straub, 1990; Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, & Cukier, 
2015).  Notably, few criminological studies of the behavior of the system trespasser 
address the possible deterrent effects of surveillance of a computer system (Maimon, 




yet examined the effect of the presence of other users on the system on the 
progression of trespassing events (where a trespassing event is the time of 
communication between the trespasser’s system and the infiltrated computer’s system 
[Christensson, 2011]).  
Cybercrime research, in general, and on the presence of users on the system, 
specifically, is of particular interest largely due to its status as a relatively 
undeveloped area of research.  Criminological theories of crime in the physical world 
(such as Situational Crime Prevention) hypothesize about the impact of the presence 
of people on crime, and research in accordance with such theories often examines this 
effect.  Thus, research applying criminological theories to the cyber world ought to 
consider analogous behavior—in this case is the presence of users on the system—to 
what is researched in the physical world.  In the same vein, because criminological 
research on cybercrime is relatively new, it is important to build a strong theoretical 
foundation for future research.  Therefore, preliminary research (such as this) 
provides key insight into the applicability of criminological theory to the cyber realm 
and lays the foundation for future development of a cybercrime paradigm. 
With a theoretical basis in Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), Deterrence 
Theory, and Routine Activities Theory (RAT), this research examines the effects of 
natural and place manager surveillance on system trespassing.  Specifically, this 
research investigates how the number and type of users on a system affects the 
number of system trespassing events (i.e. the number of times a trespasser returns to 
the system), the average time duration of a trespassing event, and the total duration of 




Chapter 2: System Trespassing 
 
The broad term “cybercrime” encompasses a multitude of Internet-based 
crimes; system trespassing, therefore, is only a single subset of these crimes.  One 
particular definition of cybercrime identifies four sub-categories: cyber-deception or 
theft, cyber-pornography, cyber-violence, and cyber-trespassing (Wall, 2003).  
Cyber-deception or theft includes fraudulent use of credit cards and piracy of virtual 
materials; cyber-pornography is the virtual publication or trading of sexually 
expressive material; and cyber-violence refers to cyber-stalking and cyber-bullying 
behaviors (Wall, 2003).  This research focuses on cyber-trespassing (also known as 
system trespassing), which is defined as “the unauthorized crossing of the boundaries 
of computer systems into spaces where rights of ownership or title have already been 
established” (Wall, 2003, p. 3).  Put another way, system trespassing is unlawfully 
gaining access to a computer system. 
System trespassers can gain access to a system in two ways: by gaining 
physical access or by gaining remote access via the Internet (Stallings, 2005).  
Whether physically or remotely, the actual process of gaining access to the system is 
relatively similar.  It begins with the system trespasser gathering information about 
the target network (i.e. a group of computer systems that are linked together through 
communication channels) by posing as a legitimate or regular user.  Next, the system 
trespasser will scan the computer network in order to assess possible vulnerabilities 
for future exploitation and will gather information on system users’ accounts 
(including their account passwords).  Then, the trespasser will attempt to enter the 




users’ passwords.  And finally, if this is successful, the trespasser will gain access to 
the system (Maimon, Wilson, Ren, & Berenblum, 2015; Wall, 2003). 
Since system trespassers often attempt to hide or disguise their online 
activities, it is very difficult to detect a system trespasser on a computer (Wall, 2003).  
Additionally, similar to crime in the physical world, system trespassing often goes 
unreported (Esterbrook, 2002).  In fact, a 2002 survey by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) found that only 34% of companies that detected system 
trespassing actually reported those incidents to authorities (Esterbrook, 2002).  
Consequently, analogous to using arrest reports to estimate prevalence of various 
crimes in the physical world, using official reports of system trespassing is likely not 
an accurate representation of the phenomenon.  
However, despite such difficulties, there are still quite a few reports that 
attempt to estimate the prevalence of system trespassing.  For instance, a 2005 study 
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that two-thirds of U.S. businesses detected 
at least one cybercrime on their system (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005).  By 2014, 
according to the U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey, the number of businesses detecting 
system trespassing incidents increased to three-fourths (77%) (Mickelberg, Pollard, & 
Shive, 2014).  Additionally, the Ponemon Institute estimated that, during the 2015 
U.S. fiscal year, the average loss for companies due to data breaches from system 
trespassing exceeded $15 million (a 19% increase from 2014); while worldwide, the 
average loss exceeded $7.7 million in 2015 (Ponemon Institute, 2015).  Despite the 
high rate of under-reporting of system trespassing, these losses due to system 




Consequently, companies have taken to using certain measures to detect, 
prevent, and mitigate system trespassing.  Intuitively, quick detection of a system 
trespassing event is an important way to minimize damage (Rubens, 2015).  
However, since detection of system trespassing is incredibly difficult (Wall, 2003), 
some Information Technology (IT) managers, as well as the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology, suggest focusing efforts on prevention and mitigation 
techniques.  For example, Homeland Security uses National Cybersecurity Protection 
System (NCPS) and Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) to secure federal 
networks by preventing intrusions, detecting intrusions early, prioritizing intrusions 
based on potential impact, and enabling personnel to mitigate the system trespass 
(Homeland Security, 2015). 
On the individual company level, IT officers propose many options for 
increasing system security in order to prevent system trespassing events, including 
having password protection, changing passwords regularly, encrypting or disguising 
files, and physically disconnecting important systems from corporate networks 
(Brumfield, 1999; Farhat, McCarthy, & Raysman, 2011; Rubens, 2015).  However, 
understandably, complete prevention can never be achieved.  As in the physical world 
where no crime prevention measures will fully stop the commission of crimes, no 
cyber-related prevention techniques will completely stop the occurrence of system 
trespassing.  Thus, in order to reduce the potential damaging outcomes of system 
trespassing, minimizing or mitigating trespassing events becomes vitally important. 
Mitigation techniques often involve surveillance of the computer system.  




humans.  Automated processes include intrusion detection and prevention systems 
(IDS/IPS) that scan and analyze networks, recognize threats, and then either send 
alerts about the detection or automatically deal with the detected threat according to 
predetermined protocols (Huey & Rosenberg, 2004; Mueller & Kuehn, 2013). 
Additionally, some companies monitor the activities of individuals on their systems 
by employing programs that capture information on their employees’ activities (e.g. 
searching employee work files, e-mails, network messages, and voicemails) (Moore, 
2000).  On the other hand, some surveillance is done in a less sophisticated way via 
manual surveillance.  Smaller companies may simply employ an individual to 
manually sift through users’ activities and files looking to identify anything 
suspicious.  This method is much more tedious, which means that not all activity is 
examined (that is simply not feasible) but all activity has the potential to be 
examined.   
Overall, the motivation behind monitoring the activities on a computer system 
is twofold: first, any system trespassing incidents can be detected and eliminated 
early; and second, system trespassers who are aware of the surveillance may reduce 
the seriousness of their trespassing events in order to avoid detection.  Both of these 
goals work to reduce the amount of time a system trespasser spends on the system, 
thereby reducing the amount of damage the trespasser can inflict.  These goals of 
mitigating system trespassing are very similar to goals drawn from Situational Crime 
Prevention, Routine Activities Theory, and Deterrence Theory and the subsequent 




Chapter 3: Theoretical Import 
3.1 Situational Crime Prevention 
 Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) was first introduced by Ronald Clarke in 
1980.  As opposed to traditional theories of crime, which focus on the disposition 
(biological, psychological, or sociological) of the offender, Clarke’s (1980) idea 
focuses on the situational aspects of crime as well as on crime as an outcome of 
choices of the offender.  In this way, SCP has a theoretical foundation in both 
Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) and Routine Activities Theory 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979).  The Rational Choice Theory aspect of SCP emphasizes that 
the process of offender decision-making is rational (i.e. intended to benefit the 
offender) and is constrained by time and available information (Cornish & Clarke, 
1986).  The Routine Activities Theory (RAT) facet of SCP focuses on the 
environmental component of crime, stating that the convergence of three elements is 
necessary for crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and lack of a 
capable guardian1 (Cohen & Felson, 1979).  Combining the decision-making aspect 
of Rational Choice and the situational context of Routine Activities provides the 
general basis for SCP.  Clarke (1980) asserts that the components that play a part in 
an individual’s decision to commit a crime will be “influenced by immediate 
situational variables and by highly specific features of the individual’s history and 
present life circumstances” (p. 138).  
                                                 
1 RAT is not wholly applicable to this research because this work does not consider all three of its core 
elements.  This work does, however, examine the surveillance components of SCP, which remain 




Due to its dual focus on situational context and offender decision-making, 
SCP proposes that crime prevention can be attained by manipulating criminogenic 
situations in order to make them less attractive to a potential offender (Clarke, 1980; 
Clarke, 1995).  These prevention recommendations fall into five categories—increase 
effort, increase the risks, reduce the rewards, reduce provocations, and remove 
excuses (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  For each category, Cornish and Clarke (2003) 
identified five concrete techniques (providing 25 crime prevention 
recommendations2), which are assumed to be effective in mitigating or reducing the 
development of criminal events.  
3.2 Restrictive Deterrence as an Outcome of SCP 
The idea of reducing the development of criminal events is not unique to SCP, 
but is echoed in new theoretical developments of one of the classic theories of 
crime—Deterrence Theory.  Deterrence Theory posits that crime deterrence occurs 
when the perceived risk and fear of formal, legal punishment for an act results in the 
omission of that act, where the risks and fear of punishment consist of the perceived 
certainty, severity, and celerity of the punishment (Gibbs, 1975).  In other words, if 
the risk of punishment is enough to counteract the benefits of the crime, then it will 
result in deterrence from crime.  Alternatively, if the risk of punishment is not enough 
to counteract the benefits of the crime, then there will be no deterrent effect.  
However, recent advancements in Deterrence Theory have come to acknowledge 
                                                 
2 Cornish and Clarke’s (2003) SCP tactics: (1) increase the effort (target harden, control access, screen 
exits, deflect offenders, control tools/weapons); (2) increase the risks (extend guardianship, assist 
natural surveillance, reduce anonymity, utilize place managers, strengthen formal surveillance); (3) 
reduce the rewards (conceal targets, remove targets, identify property, disrupt markets, deny benefits); 
(4) reduce provocations (reduce frustrations and stress, avoid disputes, reduce emotional arousal, 
neutralize peer pressure, discourage imitation); (5) remove excuses (set rules, post instructions, alert 




additional outcomes other than the do-or-don’t commit crime dyad, specifically 
differentiating between absolute and restrictive deterrence (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 
2010). 
Absolute deterrence involves wholly refraining from a particular type of 
criminal act because of a perceived risk of punishment; while restrictive deterrence 
describes the “curtailment of a certain type of criminal activity” due to fear of 
punishment (Gibbs, 1975).  In other words, where absolute deterrence involves an 
individual abstaining from crime for the rest of his or her life, restrictive deterrence 
involves a reduction in the frequency with which a crime is committed for someone 
who has already committed the crime at least once (Gibbs, 1975).  In order to expand 
the scope of this concept, Jacobs (2010) elaborated further that restrictive deterrence 
could also result in modification of the initial crime.  Such modification includes 
reducing the seriousness of the crime, modifying the behaviors in order to reduce the 
risk of detection (e.g. wearing a mask to avoid identification), and altering the spatial-
temporal component of the criminal event (Jacobs, 2010).  In particular, three of these 
dimensions of restrictive deterrence (reduce frequency, reduce seriousness, and 
modifying behaviors to reduce the risk of detection) are consistent with SCP’s goals 
of reducing the progression of criminal events. 
Overall, SCP proposes that opportunity-reducing measures that are focused on 
a specific form of crime, that manipulate the immediate environment, and that make 
crime more risky or less rewarding can aid in crime mitigation (Clarke & Cornish, 




Deterrence Theory leads to the conclusion that SCP opportunity-reducing measures 
have the potential to result in restrictive deterrence. 
3.3 Increasing the Risks of Crime via Surveillance 
One of the original strategies proposed by Clarke (1980) to reduce the 
occurrence of crime involves the introduction of surveillance means.  Surveillance in 
SCP is relatively analogous to the presence of a capable guardian in RAT (Felson, 
1995).  Both guardianship and surveillance propose the “physical or symbolic 
presence” of one or multiple individuals whose mere presence increases the potential 
of an offender being detected and, therefore, increases the risk of the crime (Hollis-
Peel, Reynald, van Bavel, Elffers, & Welsh, 2011).  Thus, the introduction of 
guardians and surveillance means serve to mitigate crime by increasing offenders’ 
perceived threat of detection and punishment. 
Clarke and Homel (1997) identify three types of surveillance: natural 
surveillance, formal surveillance, and surveillance by place managers.  Natural 
surveillance is commonly associated with Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED3) (Erickson & Houck, 2005), but is also a technique of SCP.  Natural 
surveillance involves manipulating the physical environment to improve everyone’s 
ability to see what is going on, which increases the chance of an offender being seen 
or detected and reduces the likelihood of crime (Erickson & Houck, 2005).  This can 
                                                 
3 CPTED is a crime prevention strategy intended to decrease the opportunity and the likelihood of 
crime by manipulating the layout of physical space.  The four main tenets are natural surveillance, 
natural access control, territorial reinforcement, and maintenance (Erickson & Houck, 2005).  Natural 
surveillance is the idea of “see and be seen,” where lighting and landscape improve users’ abilities to 
see what is going on; natural access control involves the use of walkways and fences (among other 
things) in order to guide the flow of people; territorial reinforcement involves clear indication of what 
is public and what is private space and enabling users of the space to have a sense of ownership and 




be accomplished by improving street lighting and promoting the “see something, say 
something” agenda.  Formal surveillance is the idea of increasing official forms of 
crime prevention personnel and hardware (Clarke, 1997).  This includes police 
presence, security guards, CCTV, red light cameras, and burglar alarms.  Lastly, 
surveillance by place managers (i.e. place manager surveillance) involves using 
employees who already have a responsibility to monitor conduct to also fulfill a 
surveillance role (Clarke, 1997).  Such personnel include building attendants, 






Chapter 4: Outcomes of Situational Crime Prevention 
 
 There is a substantial amount of literature applying Situational Crime 
Prevention to various crimes—including robberies (convenience store and fast-food 
restaurant) (Exum, Kuhns, Koch, & Johnson, 2010), barroom violence (Graham, 
2009), street crime (Painter & Farrington, 2001), worldwide piracy (Shane, Piza, & 
Mandala, 2015), retail theft (Hayes, Downs, & Blackwood, 2012), environmental 
offenses (Huisman & van Erp, 2013), organized crime (von Lampe, 2011), and 
terrorism (Weenink, 2012), among others.  Overall, such research finds a significant 
relationship between the application of SCP tactics and a reduction in various types of 
crime (Exum et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2012; Huisman & van Erp, 2013; Painter & 
Farrington, 2001; Shane et al., 2015).  In fact, Eck (1997), in a review of literature 
testing Situational Crime Prevention, found largely positive results across a number 
of crime types.  Approximately 90% of the evaluated interventions resulted in crime 
reductions (Eck, 1997).  From this, Eck (1997) concluded that Situational Crime 
Prevention tactics that are aimed at specific crimes in specific places hold promise for 
crime reduction. 
4.1 Surveillance in the Physical World 
More relevant to this work, there are some studies that test the applicability of 
particular aspects of SCP, such as the surveillance tactics within the SCP category of 
increasing the risks of crime.  For example, Painter and Farrington (2001) found that 
increasing the amount of street lighting, which increases an offender’s risk of being 




dark.  In another study, Welsh and Farrington (2004) compared the effects of CCTV 
(formal surveillance) with those of improved street lighting (natural surveillance) on 
crime in public spaces.  Their results indicated that both techniques were effective in 
reducing crime (Welsh & Farrington, 2004).  More specifically, improved street 
lighting was more effective in city centers (than was CCTV) and both surveillance 
types were more effective in reducing property crimes rather than violent crimes 
(Welsh & Farrington, 2004).  In a meta-analysis of the effectiveness of CCTV, Welsh 
& Farrington (2009) found that CCTV was effective in reducing crime, but this was 
largely driven by its high efficacy in car parks and on public transport, elsewhere the 
effects were modest.   
Less common in research is a focus on place manager surveillance.  One such 
study examines the importance of the behavior and decisions of a bar manager in 
determining whether or not violence will occur in that bar.  Madensen and Eck (2008) 
hypothesized that managers, not just the crime-rate and other neighborhood 
characteristics, could have an effect on the amount of violent crime in a bar.  Their 
research supported this hypothesis and highlighted the important role the place 
mangers play in reducing crime.  Madensen and Eck (2008) concluded that managers 
can “create settings that can suppress the effect of outside influences” or they can 
“create environments that permit or encourage violent behavior regardless of 
contextual characteristics” (p. 122). 
In particular, research on the deterrent effect of surveillance techniques on 
burglary is especially applicable to this research because burglary is often considered 




a building without being authorized to do so” with the intent to commit an offense; 
while system trespassing is defined as gaining access to a computer system without 
authorization for the purpose of committing a crime (Brenner, 2010, p. 50).  Within 
their definitions, there are clear parallels between burglary and system trespassing.  
Despite sometimes dramatic differences between the respective physical and cyber 
domains for burglary and system trespassing, we can still guide inquiry into system 
trespassing based upon insight derived from the former.  One study in particular by 
Wilcox, Madensen, and Tillyer (2007) examined the effects of natural and place 
manager surveillance on burglary victimization.  The results suggested that natural 
surveillance (in the form of the physical layout of the space) and place manager 
surveillance (in the form of homeowner occupancy) both decreased the likelihood of 
burglary victimization (conditional on neighborhood surveillance factors) (Wilcox et 
al., 2007).  Overall, past research on surveillance in the physical world shows support 
for all three forms of surveillance (natural, place manager, and formal) as techniques 
to reduce various types of crime. 
4.2 Situational Crime Prevention in Cyberspace 
 The application of SCP to system trespassing is a relatively new endeavor, 
which comes with its own challenges (namely, applying a theory that is quite 
enmeshed in the physical world to the cyber world).  Accordingly, there is a dearth of 
research empirically testing the application of SCP principles in the context of system 
trespassing.  For instance, Maimon et al. (2014) found that presenting a warning 
banner providing a threat of sanction (i.e. removing the excuses of the crime) at the 




(see also Stockman, Heile, & Rein, 2015).  Similarly, Wilson et al. (2015) found that 
a surveillance banner indicating formal surveillance and monitoring of the system 
(i.e. increasing the risks of the crime) displayed at the time of entry to a hacked 
system reduced the probability of commands being entered on the system for 
trespassers who were on the system longer. 
However, as of yet, there is no empirical research examining how the presence 
of users on the system influences the progression of system trespassing events.  In 
fact, unlike burglary in the physical world, there has not yet been any research 
examining natural or place manager surveillance in cyberspace.  Addressing these 
gaps, this study seeks to determine whether the number (one or multiple) and type 
(administrative or non-administrative) of users on the system will influence the 















Chapter 5:  The Present Study 
 
This thesis examines the surveillance and guardianship aspects inherent in 
SCP and RAT, particularly investigating the effects of natural surveillance and place 
manager surveillance on system trespassing.  As previously discussed, in the physical 
world, natural surveillance is the ability of people to see and be seen.  Natural 
surveillance in the physical world is often associated with improving the street 
lighting or manipulating the layout of the physical environment in some way that 
improves visibility.  In the cyber world, natural surveillance can be considered the 
ability of users on a system to see the actions of other users.  These users are the 
average, everyday users of the system (i.e. non-administrative users) and do not hold 
any special duties, administrative or otherwise (the equivalent of a regular citizen in 
the physical world).  Unlike in the physical world, there is no physical environment to 
manipulate in cyberspace.  Instead, the number of users present on a system can affect 
the ability to see other users’ actions.  The larger the number of users on a system, the 
more activity is present on the system, and the more difficult it is for an 
administrative user to sift through that activity in order to identify suspicious behavior 
or unauthorized users.  Alternatively, the fewer the number of users on a system, the 
less activity on the system and the easier it is for an administrative user to be alert for 
and identify suspicious behavior. 
In the physical world, place manager surveillance involves the manager of a 
specific place taking on a surveillance role in addition to his/her current monitoring 
role.  The most common example of a place manager is a convenience store clerk.  




additionally, they may be charged with surveillance of the store, where they are also 
expected to keep an eye on the store and make sure nothing suspicious or nefarious 
happens.  In cyberspace, a place manager is equivalent to an administrator of a system 
(someone who has more responsibility and power than a regular user) taking on the 
additional role of surveillance on the system.  In this case, the user has administrative 
power on the system because of their employment position, and due to that extra 
power they also have the ability to oversee the actions of the other users on the 
system and be alert for system trespassers.  Thus, if a system trespasser perceives 
either kind of surveillance on the system (natural or place manager), he/she may fear 
detection and reduce the progression of the system trespassing incident. 
In accordance with SCP and restrictive deterrence, reducing the progression of 
a system trespassing event can be measured by the frequency and seriousness of the 
crime.  In this context, the frequency and seriousness of system trespassing is 
measured in three ways: the number of times a trespasser returns to the system 
(number of repeat trespassing events), the average duration of a system trespassing 
event, and the total duration of all system trespassing events.  It is expected that 
surveillance, indicating an increased risk of detection, will result in a trespasser 
reducing the amount of time he/she spends on the system (in total and on average per 
trespassing event) and reducing the number of times he/she returns to the system.  
5.1 Hypotheses 
Accordingly, this research proposes six hypotheses.  It is expected that the 
presence of an administrative user (i.e. a place manager), as a result of their position 




therefore, reduce the progression of system trespassing.  Thus, the presence of an 
administrative user on the attacked system (compared to a non-administrative user) 
(1a) will reduce the number of repeated system trespassing events; (1b) will reduce 
the average duration of a system trespassing event; and (1c) will reduce the total 
duration of all system trespassing events.   
Additionally, it is expected that the presence of a greater number of computer 
users on the attacked system will provide protection from detection (because of the 
increased amount of activity on the system) and will prompt the progression of a 
system trespassing event.  Thus, the presence of multiple users on the system 
(compared to one user) (2a) will result in a greater number of system trespassing 
events; (2b) will result in a longer average duration of a system trespassing event; 














Chapter 6: Data and Methods 
 
This research tests these hypotheses using system trespassing data collected 
from a randomized control trial of target computers (i.e. honeypots) deployed on the 
Internet infrastructure of a large U.S. academic institution in order to be attacked.  
Target computers are “virtual or physical hosts used for the sole purpose of collecting 
malicious activity” (Cukier, Maimon, & Berthier, 2012, p. 27).  The activity detected 
on the target computers is suspect by nature (and deemed “malicious”) because target 
computers have no value and therefore there is no reason for a legitimate user to 
communicate with them (Spitzner, 2003).  Thus, all the activity collected from a 
target computer can be reasonably assumed to be the activity of system trespassers.  
Furthermore, target computers are a passive entity, meaning they do not entice system 
trespassers to infiltrate the system, but rather they allow a trespasser to initiate a 
system trespassing event on his/her own accord (Spitzner, 2003).  Therefore, the 
information collected from target computers is unique in that it is likely an accurate 
representation of the activities system trespassers actually engage in when on a 
compromised system. 
6.1 Experimental Design 
This research uses data collected from target computers deployed on a U.S. 
university network to be attacked.  The deployment of the target computers is 
depicted in Figure 1.  As Figure 1 shows, each new trespasser IP address4 is assigned 
its own target computer, all of which are connected to the same network. 
                                                 
4 IP addresses are the public identification numbers assigned to computers that allow computers to 




Over the deployment period, the target computers captured the movements of 
any trespassers that infiltrated their systems.  In order to gain access to the system, the 
system trespassers had to guess (or crack) the passwords of the system’s “legitimate 
users” (Maimon et al., 2015), usually using brute-force techniques, such as programs 
that are built for cracking passwords (McQuade, 2006).  The target computers were 
structured to deny a trespasser access until an nth try (where n was a randomized 
number between 100 and 200).  Upon attempting access the nth time, the trespasser 
would be allowed access to the system and the nth login credentials would be treated 
as legitimate credentials for that trespasser moving forward.  System trespassers were 
identified and connected to their fake system credentials by their IP addresses. 
Therefore, once a particular IP address gained access to the system, it was allowed 
access only under its unique credentials.  By attaching unique credentials to each 
system trespasser’s specific target computer, it is most likely that anyone who 
subsequently used those credentials to access that target computer was the same 
trespasser.  And by identifying system trespassers via their IP addresses, each system 
trespasser was assigned his/her own target computer and was only exposed to one 
experimental condition.  However, system trespassers who manipulated their IP 
addresses could gain access to the system under different credentials and potentially 
be exposed to different conditions, ramifications of which will be discussed in the 
limitations section. 
System trespassers were allowed to re-access the system using that same login 
and password for 30 days, meaning the trespassers could engage in multiple 




other words, after a trespasser brute-forced his/her way into the system and attained 
login credentials, they had to return to the system and use those credentials to log in 
in order to actually begin a trespassing event on the system.  Additionally, trespassers 
could open more than one line of communication at a time (similar to opening 
multiple tabs of a web browser), meaning more than one trespassing event could 
occur simultaneously.  After 30 days, the trespasser was blocked from entering, the 
system was cleaned, and the target computer was redeployed to be attacked again.  
Figure 2 describes and visually represents this process.  It is important to keep in 
mind that this process occurs for each new IP address or trespasser that attempts to 
infiltrate the target computer system. 
Upon gaining access to the system, the target computer for the system 
trespasser was randomly assigned to the control group or one of four treatment 
conditions.  The assigned condition was associated with the number and type of fake 
users that would appear to be on the system at the same time as the system trespasser.  
The control did not have any additional users on the system.  The first treatment 
condition had one non-administrative user on the system; the second treatment 
condition had one administrative user on the system; the third treatment condition had 
ten non-administrative users; and the fourth treatment condition had nine non-
administrative users and one administrative user.  In the interest of parsimony, the 
conditions will be referred to as one user (no administrator), one user (administrator), 
multiple users (no administrator), and multiple users (administrator), respectively.  
For reference, Table 1 provides the names of each condition as well as the number 




For all of the treatment conditions, the fake users cycled on and off the target 
computer system on eight-hour, offset intervals, so that the treatment conditions 
would always have the same number and type of users according to the random 
condition originally assigned to the system trespasser’s target computer, but the users 
themselves would not be the same (as evidenced by their system username).  For 
example, if a system trespasser was randomly assigned to one user (no administrator), 
then at all times there would appear to be a single non-administrative user on the 
system, but every eight hours the username of that user would change so as to imitate 
the natural movement of users logging in and out of a system.  In other words, it 
would appear as though a different user had logged onto the system, but, regardless, 
the system trespasser was always exposed to that same condition.  
The data for this thesis come from seven (non-consecutive5) months of the 
captured movements of trespassers on the target computers, collected between July 
2014 and March 2015.  Over this time, 448 trespassers gained access to target 
computers and 6,179 total system trespassing events were initiated against those 
target computers.  The data collected include information on the system trespassing 
events (e.g. the number of trespassing events, the duration of the events, etc.), the IP 
address of the trespasser, the username of the trespasser, and the randomly assigned 
treatment condition of the trespasser’s target computer.   
                                                 
5 There were some months during the data collection period during which no target computers were 
infiltrated.  Consequently, this study utilizes seven months of recorded trespassing events and does not 




6.2 Outcome Measures 
The dependent variables for this thesis are the number of system trespassing 
events (a count variable indicating the number of trespassing events each system 
trespasser had on the system), the average duration of the trespassing incident (a 
continuous variable indicating the average amount of time the trespasser was on the 
system per event, measured in minutes6), and the total amount of time the trespasser 
spent on the target computer (a continuous variable also measured in minutes).  Initial 
analysis of these variables uncovered two issues.  First, for the number of system 
trespassing events, 197 trespassers had zero system trespassing events.  This indicates 
that a system trespasser gained access to the system, but after receiving the fake 
system credentials did not return to the system and begin any trespassing events.  
Because this analysis is focused on the effect of surveillance on users who actually 
began trespassing events, the observations with zero events were dropped from the 
final analysis, bringing the number of trespassers to 251.   
Second, a similar issue existed with the average duration of the trespassing 
event and total duration of the trespassing events.  Some trespassers who did begin 
trespassing after gaining access to the system had trespassing events that lasted zero 
seconds.  This could be the result of a trespasser who began an event but immediately 
stopped (allowing the system to acknowledge that the trespasser logged on, but 
resulting in an event that lasted zero seconds).  Alternatively, this may have been a 
glitch in the program that resulted in no time being recorded for those trespassing 
                                                 
6 Data on the average duration of the system trespassing events were originally collected in seconds.  
However, the long periods of time many trespassers spent on the system made for nonsensical and 
difficult interpretations when reported in seconds.  To remedy this, the duration variable was divided 
by 60, producing a continuous variable indicating the average number of minutes a trespasser spent on 




events.  As with the observations with zero events, trespassers that had trespassing 
events of zero time were removed from the analysis, resulting in 239 system 
trespassers.  The exclusion of the zero event and zero time observations affected the 
distribution of the experimental conditions in an unexpected way.  Table 2 shows the 
distribution prior to excluding the two types of zeros and after excluding first the zero 
event observations (n=197) and then the zero time observations (n=12).  As the table 
indicates, the trespassers that had zeros were more likely to be those assigned to 
target computers with one user (administrator) or multiple users (administrator).   
Recognizing the potential consequences of these unevenly distributed zero 
observations, diagnostics were run in an attempt to explore and understand 
differences in the composition of the zero observations.  I examined the distributions 
of the types of system trespassers that gained access to the system.  Specifically, I 
looked at the distribution of administrative usernames used by the system trespassers 
to access the system in each condition.7  System trespassers choose the username they 
are going to attack at the beginning of the attack, before they would be randomly 
assigned to any of the experimental conditions.  As such, this distribution should be 
evenly distributed across the experimental conditions due to random assignment.  
Disparities in the distribution of usernames would indicate the presence of an 
underlying bias impacting which system trespassers were in the zero observations.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of administrative system trespassers across the 
experimental conditions for the sample that includes all zero observations (n=448) 
and for the sample that excludes all zero observations (n=239).  For the full sample, 
                                                 
7 System trespassers are capable of gaining access to the system as an administrative user or as a 
regular user (e.g. non-administrator).  Gaining access as an administrator gives a trespasser more 




the percent of observations that were administrative trespassers ranges from 
approximately 85% to 89%; and the reduced sample has between 90% and 98% 
administrative trespassers, depending on the condition.  As indicated in Table 3, the 
exclusion of the zero observations increased the proportion of administrative 
trespassers across all conditions.  This effect is largest for the one user (no 
administrator) and multiple users (no administrator) conditions, increasing the 
proportion by 9% and 10.5%, respectively.  The remaining conditions (control, one 
user [administrator], and multiple users [administrator]) increase between 3% and 
6%. 
Additionally, Table 3 shows that the overall percentage of administrative 
trespassers is 88% in the full sample and 95% in the reduced sample.  Although this 
indicates an increase in the proportion of administrative system trespassers, on the 
whole these proportions are still quite high and relatively similar.  Thus, the exclusion 
of the zero event and time observations does not appear to be considerably altering 
the composition of the sample in terms of the system trespasser user type. 
Initial analysis of the number of system trespassing events also indicated the 
existence of potential outliers on the high end of the number of trespassing events 
distribution.  First, all observations with greater than 200 trespassing events (four 
observations) were removed because they were quite far from the remainder of the 
distribution and likely would have had undue influence on the results.  Next, there 
was one observation (139 trespassing events) that was uncertain as to whether it was 
too far from the distribution.  The analysis was conducted with and without this 




the outcome; therefore, it was removed from the final analysis.  Ultimately, five 
outlying observations were removed due to concerns for their influence on the results.  
After accounting for the zeros and outliers, the final number of observations was 234 
trespassers who initiated a total of 4,517 trespassing events.  Figures 3, 4, and 5 show 
the final distributions for the number of trespassing events, the average duration of 
the event, and the total duration of the system trespassing events, respectively.  As the 
histograms indicate, the distributions of the outcome variables are right skewed, 
consequences of which will be discussed later. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the number of system trespassing 
events, the average duration of the event, and the total duration on the system for the 
sample.  It indicates that the average number of trespassing events is just less than 20 
incidents, with a minimum of 1 incident and a maximum of 108 incidents.  
Additionally, Table 4 shows the average duration per trespassing event ranges from 
0.01 minutes to 78.61 minutes, with a mean of 13.83 minutes.  Lastly, the total 
duration of trespassing events has a mean of 151.94 minutes (about 2 and one half 
hours) and ranges from .02 minutes to 1021.88 minutes. 
Table 5 depicts the number of system trespassers, the total number of 
trespassing events, the average number of events per trespasser, the average mean 
duration of events per trespasser, and the average total duration per trespasser for 
each experimental condition.  The number of trespassers assigned to each 
experimental condition ranges from 21 (multiple users [administrator]) to 67 (one 





In order to determine whether the presence and type of other users on a system 
has an effect on the progression of the system trespassing event, this research 
examined whether there was a difference in means between the experimental 
conditions for the total number of system trespassing events, average duration of the 
system trespassing event, and total duration of the trespassing events.  Experimental 
data lends itself to answering these questions because potential unobserved 
heterogeneity across treatment groups is mitigated with random assignment, making 
the groups balanced on expectation for observables and unobservables.  In other 
words, a randomized control trial provides confidence that the differences in the 
outcomes are due to the treatment.  This research tested the hypotheses in two steps:  
first by utilizing one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) in order to determine if 
there was a difference in means for at least one of the experimental conditions; 
second, if there was a difference in means, by using post hoc Tukey tests8 to examine 










                                                 
8 The post hoc Tukey test is favorable here over a normal pairwise t-test because it controls for the 
Type I error rate (or the inflation of alpha) that occurs when doing multiple comparisons across groups. 
9 ANOVA is an omnibus test, where the null hypothesis is that all group means are equal.  Therefore, a 
rejection of this null hypothesis only indicates that at least one group mean is significantly different, 
but does not indicate how many are different or specifically which ones are different.  The second 
stage of testing, using post hoc Tukey tests, compares across all possible pairings of group means and 




Chapter 7: Results 
7.1 Number of Trespassing Events 
 I began my analysis by testing the hypotheses regarding the number of 
repeated trespassing events (1a and 2a).  Table 6 reports the analysis of variance 
results.10  Here, the null hypothesis was that there were no differences between the 
average numbers of repeated trespassing events across the experimental conditions.  
With a p-value less than .01 (p=0.0000) and an F statistic of 7.70, I reject the null 
hypothesis, indicating that at least one mean was significantly different from the 
others.  Additionally, Table 6 reports the eta-squared11 value for this ANOVA.  The 
eta-squared indicates that approximately 11.9% of the variance in the number of 
trespassing events is explained by the experimental condition assignment.  The 
second step for testing these hypotheses examined which means were different across 
the experimental conditions using post hoc Tukey tests. 
 Table 7 shows the results for whether the presence of administrative users 
compared to non-administrative users on the system reduced the number of 
trespassing events (Hypothesis 1a).  To test this, I analyzed the comparisons 
according to presence of an administrative user on the system, while controlling for 
the number of users on the system.  This resulted in two tests: one between the one 
user (administrator) and one user (no administrator) conditions, and the other between 
the multiple users (administrator) and multiple users (no administrator) conditions.  
                                                 
10 Due to the skewed distributions of the three outcome variables (violating the normality assumption 
of ANOVA), the Kruskal-Wallis H-test was also performed.  The Kruskal-Wallis H-test is a non-
parametric test with relaxed normality assumptions.  The results of this test were in agreement with the 
results of ANOVA, so ANOVA is used and reported for this analysis. 
11 Eta-squared is a measure of the effect size of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  It 




Table 7 indicates that trespassers assigned to target computers with one user 
(administrator) had significantly fewer trespassing incidents than those assigned to 
one user (no administrator).  In fact, trespassers who had the one user (administrator) 
condition had (on average) almost 20 fewer trespassing incidents than those that had 
one user (no administrator) on the system (4.33 trespassing incidents versus 23.82, 
respectively).  Additionally, trespassers assigned to target computers with multiple 
users (administrator) had significantly fewer trespassing incidents (about 22 less) than 
those with multiple users (no administrator) (4.43 trespassing incidents compared to 
26.72, respectively).  Because these means are significantly different, it appears that 
the presence of administrative users, as opposed to non-administrative users, reduced 
the number of trespassing events, which provides support for Hypothesis 1a. 
 Hypothesis 2a (whether a greater number of users on the system increases the 
number of trespassing events) was tested by analyzing comparisons according to the 
number of users on the system, controlling for the type of users on the system.  This 
too resulted in two tests: one between multiple users (no administrator) and one user 
(no administrator), and the second between multiple users (administrator) and one 
user (administrator).  As Table 7 indicates, there were no significant differences in the 
number of trespassing events for either of these comparisons.  This lack of 
significance does not necessarily disprove Hypothesis 2a, but it also does not find 
support for it.  Thus, it does not appear that the number of fake users on the system 
had an effect on the number of system trespassing events by trespassers. 
 The results in Table 7 further illustrate the lack of effect of the number of 




similar magnitude of effect for the type of user, regardless of the number of users.  
For example, system trespassers who had one user (administrator) on the system 
versus those with one user (no administrator) had nearly 20 fewer trespassing 
incidents; while system trespassers with multiple users (administrator) versus those 
with one user (no administrator) also had almost 20 fewer trespassing incidents.  
Therefore, compared to having one user (no administrator) on the system, whether the 
system trespasser had a target computer with one user (administrator) or multiple 
users (administrator) had no different effect on the number of trespassing events.  
Similarly, system trespassers assigned to one user (administrator) versus multiple 
users (no administrator) had approximately 22 fewer trespassing events; and those 
assigned to multiple users (administrator) also had 22 fewer trespassing events 
compared to those assigned to multiple users (no administrator).   
 Additionally, Table 7 shows significant differences between one user 
(administrator) versus control and multiple users (administrator) versus control.  Both 
of these comparisons show that trespassers on target computers with an 
administrative user (regardless of the number of users) had significantly fewer 
trespassing events (14 fewer) compared to trespassers on target computers with no 
users present.  Combining this finding with the findings of the significant differences 
between trespassers with administrative users and those with non-administrative 
users, I find that where trespassers on target computers with administrative users had 
14 fewer trespassing incidents than those on control target computers (4 trespassing 
events versus 18), trespassers assigned to administrative users had 20-22 fewer 




events versus 24-26), regardless of the number of users on the system.  This indicates 
that trespassers assigned to administrative users had the least trespassing incidents 
and trespassers assigned to non-administrative users had the most, with the control 
assignment falling in the middle.  Not only does this agree with the previous finding 
that it is the type of user over the number of users that is of most importance, but this 
also indicates that the presence of non-administrative users may in fact increase the 
number of trespassing events compared to having no users on the system or having an 
administrative user on the system. 
7.2 Average Duration of Trespassing Event 
 The next two hypotheses (1b and 2b) tested the effects of the number and type 
of users on the average duration of the trespassing event per trespasser.  The ANOVA 
results for the first stage of testing the average duration are shown in Table 8.  The 
analysis of variance for average duration of the trespassing event is not significant 
with an F statistic of 1.47 (p>.05).  Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the 
ANOVA and conclude there were no significant differences in means between the 
groups.  Additionally, the eta-squared value of 0.025 indicates that the experimental 
condition only explained about 2.5% of the variance in the average duration of the 
event, which is expectedly small given the lack of significance. 
Because I fail to reject the null hypothesis, the next step for evaluating this set 
of hypotheses is not necessary, and I fail to find support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b.  
Therefore, it appears that neither the number of users nor the type of users on the 




7.3 Total Duration of System Trespassing Events 
 Hypotheses 1c and 2c tested the effects of number and type of users on the 
total duration of the system trespassing events.  The analysis of variance for this 
relationship is presented in Table 9.  The ANOVA for the total duration of system 
trespassing events was statistically significant with an F statistic of 6.14 (p=0.0006).  
As such, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the means was 
significantly different for the total duration of the trespassing events.  Here, eta-
squared indicates that the experimental condition explained about 8.2% of the 
variation in the total duration of the trespassing events—not as much as the effect size 
for the number of trespassing events, but a far bigger effect size than found for the 
average duration of the trespassing event.  Next, I utilized post hoc Tukey tests to 
identify specifically which means were significantly different. 
 Results for the post hoc Tukey tests for the total duration of system 
trespassing events are presented in Table 10.  To examine whether the type of user 
affects the total trespassing duration, I compared the conditions by the type of users, 
while controlling for the number of users.  As Table 10 shows, the only significant 
difference for type of user is between multiple users (administrator) versus multiple 
users (no administrator).  This finding indicates that, for trespassers assigned to target 
computers with multiple users on them, the presence of an administrative user 
(compared to a non-administrative user) reduced the total duration of trespassing 
events by nearly 153 minutes.  This reduced the total duration from 214.55 minutes to 




significant for one user (administrator) compared to one user (no administrator), 
providing partial support for Hypothesis 1c. 
Also indicated in Table 10, holding the type of user constant and comparing 
across different numbers of users did not result in any significant differences.  This 
conclusion fails to provide support for Hypothesis 2c.  However, there was a 
significant difference when examining across both number and type of users.  
Trespassers assigned to target computers with multiple users (no administrator) 
compared to those assigned to one user (administrator) had significantly longer total 
durations (147 minutes longer).  This continues to provide partial support for the 
importance of the type of user over the number of users in reducing the progression of 
system trespassing. 
 Overall, this research provides evidence of support for Hypotheses 1a and 1c, 
as seen in Table 11.  These findings indicate that it is the type of user on the system—
not the number—that had a significant impact on the number of trespassing events 
and the total duration of the system trespassing events, but that neither number nor 

















Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
 This thesis expanded on prior research on system trespassing by investigating 
the impact of the presence of users on a system on the progression of trespassing 
events.  In general, results indicated that the presence of users on a system did in fact 
have a significant impact on the progression of trespassing events (though not 
consistently across all comparisons). 
 More specifically, this thesis examined whether the number and type of 
computer users on a system reduced the number of trespassing events, average 
duration of each event, and total duration of the system trespassing events for system 
trespassers.  Support was found for the presence of an administrative user on a system 
reducing the number of trespassing events (Hypothesis 1a) and partially for the 
presence of an administrative user on the system reducing the total duration of 
trespassing events (Hypothesis 1c).  In fact, system trespassers who had target 
computers with an administrative user present returned to the system between 20 and 
22 fewer times than system trespassers who had target computers with only non-
administrative users present (reducing the number of trespassing events by about a 
factor of 5.5) and 14 fewer times than trespassers assigned to target computers with 
no users present (reducing the number of trespassing events by a factor of 3.5), 
regardless of the number of users on the system.  Additionally, for multiple users on 
the system, system trespassers with target computers with an administrative user 
present spent 153 fewer minutes (about 2.5 fewer hours) on the system than 
trespassers whose target computers did not have an administrative user present, which 




effect on the average duration of the trespassing event and the number of users had no 
significant effects on the number of trespassing events, the average duration of the 
event, or the total duration of the system trespassing events. 
 These findings have interesting implications for the application of 
criminological theories to the cyber world.  Generally, this study tested the effect of 
surveillance or guardianship on the progression of system trespassing.  In accordance 
with SCP and RAT, surveillance and guardianship, respectively, should serve to deter 
offenders from committing crime.  Specifically, this study compared the effects of 
natural and place manager surveillance.  The findings indicate that place manager 
surveillance (or the presence of an administrative user) may be a more effective 
deterrent technique in cyberspace than natural surveillance (or controlling the number 
of users on the system).  The lack of significant findings for the number of users on 
the system indicates that natural surveillance did not play a role in reducing the 
progression of a trespassing event in this study.  In fact, the presence of an 
administrative user was significant regardless of the total number of users on the 
system with regards to the number of trespassing events.  This indicates that both 
SCP and RAT are partially supported in this study.  The presence of surveillance or a 
guardian in the form of an administrative user significantly diminished the impact of 
the crime, by decreasing the number of times a trespasser returned to the system and 
the total duration of the system trespassing events. 
In terms of deterrence, the findings of this study support the hypothesized 
restrictive deterrent effect, as opposed to an absolute deterrent effect.  Although the 




the event, the significant reduction of the number of trespassing events and total 
duration of the trespassing events still indicates that the frequency and seriousness of 
the crime was at least partially reduced.  In other words, trespassers were returning to 
the system fewer times and, overall, remaining on the system for a shorter duration of 
time.  Importantly, this indicates that the trespassers may have reduced the number of 
events, and consequently the amount of time on the system, in an effort to avoid 
detection, which is evidence of behavior modification consistent with restrictive 
deterrence.  Additionally, this decrease in the amount of total time on the system 
results in less opportunity for the trespasser to do damage to the system. 
 Overall, this research shows support for applying criminological theories to 
system trespassing.  SCP and RAT are partially supported with regards to place 
manager surveillance, and the presence of a place manager resulted in the trespasser 
returning to the system fewer times and spending less total time on the system 
(resulting in a restrictive deterrent effect). 
 Policy implications of these findings are fairly straightforward.  IT managers 
can implement security programs that add the presence of a fake administrative user 
on the system at all times.  As this thesis suggests, this simple task could reduce the 
number of times a system trespasser returns to the system and the total amount of 
time spent on the system, thus reducing the potential damage.  Importantly, the 
findings presented here do not suggest that the addition of an administrative user 
would increase the progression of the trespassing event.  However, future research is 




university currently evaluated by this thesis, and these results must be taken in light 
of important limitations. 
8.1 Limitations and Future Research 
 The limitations of this research are largely due to the data available for 
analysis.  First, these results are questionable in their generalizability beyond the 
university setting in which this experiment took place.  Additionally, there are some 
limitations in terms of the treatment fidelity of the experiment.  As previously 
mentioned, there is the potential for a single system trespasser to be subject to more 
than one experimental condition.  Because the experiment tracked trespassers based 
on their IP addresses, those who altered their IP addresses had the potential to regain 
access to the system on a new target computer and be randomly assigned a different 
condition.  This limitation reduces the assurance of independence of the observations.  
Yet, if this issue did occur in this data, the same system trespasser experiencing 
multiple experimental conditions would bias the results toward insignificant findings, 
which actually strengthens the significance of the findings of this study. 
 Perhaps one of the most important limitations for this study is the large 
number of zero observations in the dataset (driven largely by the number of zero 
event observations).  As previously mentioned, the system trespassers who had zeros 
were not distributed evenly across the experimental conditions.  In fact, the two 
conditions that had administrative users were far more affected by both zero event 
and zero time observations (i.e. they had a larger proportion of trespassers who had 
zeros).  These zeros are problematic because their uneven distribution could indicate 




assigned to target computers with administrative users compared to those assigned to 
the other conditions.  Interestingly, further analysis revealed that the removal of the 
zeros did not substantially alter the proportion of administrative system trespassers in 
each condition separately or across conditions altogether.  This finding indicates that 
perhaps the removal of the zeros did not affect the populations of the conditions quite 
as negatively as expected.  However, this sensitivity analysis was limited in scope and 
only went so far in addressing the potential biasing effect of the nonrandom 
distribution of zeros.  Ultimately, the analysis did not and cannot disprove that there 
was bias in the uneven distribution of zeros across experimental conditions.  
Therefore, as it is still difficult to identify the source of the zeros and their unequal 
distribution, further research is needed to investigate this issue and to guide future 
research experiments within this domain. 
By addressing these limitations, future research can build on this analysis in 
multiple ways.  Implementation of target computer experiments can be incredibly 
insightful for analyzing the behavior of system trespassers, however it is essential to 
ensure treatment fidelity and controlled randomization.  Future experiments should be 
executed across different areas, not just on university networks and not just in the 
United States.  Such experiments would provide more rich data regarding system 
trespasser actions in more generalizable samples.  Additionally, future research 
should investigate other measures of the progression of a trespassing event.  Where 
this study only examined the number of events, average duration of the trespassing 
event, and total duration of system trespassing events, further research could also 




deterrent effect of surveillance with regards to the actual actions of the system 
trespassers while on the system (e.g. whether particular actions are deterred by the 
surveillance).  Moreover, this analysis only looked at the effect of the presence of one 
administrative user on system trespassing, and future studies should investigate the 
effects of different numbers of place managers or administrative users.  Lastly, future 
research on the effect of formal surveillance in cyberspace would be germane to 
investigating the effect of surveillance by allowing for comparison across all three 
surveillance types. 
 This work provides further credence to applying criminological theories to 
system trespassing.  However, it is clear that the theories do not work in the cyber 
world exactly as they do in the physical world; certain theories may only partially 
apply or may not apply at all.  Consequently, this highlights the importance of 
examining the differences in the mechanisms and outcomes of applying 




Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 System trespassing is a topical and undesirable phenomenon.  As its 
prevalence increases, so do its deleterious effects to people, companies, and countries.  
However, research on system trespassing mostly looks at the technical side of the act 
(i.e. how system trespassers gain access to a system).  In terms of the research that 
does examine system trespassing from a criminological perspective (i.e. the actions of 
the system trespassers after gaining access to the system), this is the first study 
examining the effect of the presence of other users on the system on the progression 
of a system trespassing event.  Utilizing ideas of surveillance and restrictive 
deterrence, this research found that the presence of an administrative user 
significantly decreased the number of trespassing events and the total duration of the 
system trespassing events but not the average duration of the trespassing event.  This 
research finds support for the application of SCP (specifically, place manager 
surveillance), RAT, and restrictive deterrence to the actions of system trespassers, 
while calling for future research to investigate the promising potential of applying 







Figure 1: Deployment of Target Computers on University Network 
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Figure 3: Histogram of Number of Trespassing Events 
 
 

















































Table 1: Description of Experimental Conditions 
 Number of Users Administrative User Present 
Control 0 N 
One User (No Admin) 1 N 
One User (Admin) 1 Y 
Multiple Users (No Admin) 10 N 
Multiple Users (Admin) 10 Y 
 






Without Zero Events 
or Zero Times 
Control 90 68 66 
One User (No Admin) 93 69 68 
One User (Admin) 91 28 24 
Multiple Users (No Admin) 84 61 60 
Multiple Users (Admin) 90 25 21 
Total 448 251 239 
 











































































Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables (n=234) 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Number of Trespassing Events 19.30 8 1 108 
Average Event Duration (minutes) 13.83 6.79 .01 78.61 

































67 1596 23.82 10.62 162.72 
One User 
(Admin) 








21 93 4.43 15.20 61.65 
 
Table 6: ANOVA for Number of Trespassing Events  
 SS df MS F Prob > F Eta Sq 
Between groups 14571.41 4 3642.85 7.70 0.0000 0.119 
Within groups 108308.05 229 472.96    














Table 7: Post Hoc Tukey Tests for Number of Trespassing Events 
 Contrast t 














































Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* p<.05 one-tailed 
** p<.01 one-tailed 
 
Table 8: ANOVA for Average Duration of Event  
 SS df MS F Prob > F Eta Sq 
Between groups 1524.06 4 381.02 1.47 0.2122 0.025 
Within groups 59367.70 229 259.25    
Total 60891.76 233 261.34    
 
Table 9: ANOVA for Total Duration of Trespassing Events  
 SS df MS F Prob > F Eta Sq 
Between groups 577335.88 4 144333.97 6.14 0.0006 0.082 
Within groups 6435846.59 229 28104.13    







Table 10: Post Hoc Tukey Tests for Total Duration of Trespassing Events 
 Contrast t 














































Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
** p<.01 one-tailed 
 
Table 11: Conclusions of Hypotheses 
 Conclusion 
Administrative Users (Place Manager Surveillance)  
Number of Events (1a) + 
Average Duration of Each Event (1b) - 
Total Duration of System Trespassing Events (1c) +/- 
Number of Users (Natural Surveillance)  
Number of Events (2a) - 
Average Duration of Each Event (2b) - 
Total Duration of System Trespassing Events (2c) - 
+ Supported 
+/- Partially Supported 






Brute-Force Entry: Using an automated method to attempt large quantities of 
username and password combinations in order to illegally gain access to a 
system 
IP Address: Unique public identification numbers assigned to every computer 
Network: A group of computer systems that are linked together through 
communication channels 
System Trespassing: Unlawfully gaining access to a computer system 
Target Computer: Virtual or physical host used to collect activity of system 
trespassers 
Trespasser (i.e. System Trespasser): Individual who unlawfully gains access to a 
computer system 
Trespassing Event (i.e. Trespassing Incident): Time of communication between the 
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